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Introduction 
Water has been the key natural-resource issue during the three millennia of 
recorded history in the Middle East. Some regions of the world are drier, and 
others have higher populations or larger economies, but no other region of the 
world embraces such a large area, with so many people striving so hard for 
economic growth on the basis of so little water. 
Three dimensions, three crises 
This paper describes water stress in the region between the Nile and the 
Tigris-Euphrates river systems and extending southward to encompass the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Gulf Islands, a little bigger than what is sometimes called the 
Mashrek. Reference will be made to a larger group of countries that includes the 
Maghreb, Libya, Sudan, and Turkey. Throughout this region, the origin of water 
stress is not limited to scarcity but stems from three interacting crises: 
Demand for fresh water in the region exceeds the naturally occurring, 
renewable supply. 
Much of the region's limited water is being polluted from growing 
volumes of human, industrial, and agricultural wastes. 
The same water is desired simultaneously by différent sectors in some 
society or wherever it flows across (or under) an international border. 
Water scarcity has been a source of stress since history began, but water quality 
is a new problem coming to dominate the crisis in many parts of the world. In this 
region, though, the politics of water is probably of greater concern than anywhere 
else in the world. Moreover, because these three crises are interdependent, any 
resolution must deal with all three - quantity, quality, equity - at the same time 
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if it is to be economically efficient, ecologically sustainable, and politically 
acceptable. 
Physical and economic sources of stress 
For most countries in the Middle East, water is the limiting resource for 
development (Fig. 1). Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey are ail fairly 
well endowed with water; the three Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia), Israel, and Egypt foret a middle group; and Jordan, Libya, and countries 
of the Arabian Peninsula are least well endowed. For Palestinians, the West Bank 
is relatively well endowed with water resources (Lowi 1993; Lonergan and Brooks 
1994). (Much of the water that occurs in the West Bank is today used in Israel.) 
The Gaza Strip is perennially short of water. However, water availability per 
capita is decreasing in every country of the region (Fig. 1). 
Water availability per capita (m'/person-year) 
Fig. 1. Water-stress codes for selected Middle Eastern countries (circles depict water stress in 1988; 
arrows show the changes in per capita water availability by 2020, assuming that per capita 
consumption stays the same). Source: Falkenmark et al. (1989). 
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Variation and uncertainty 
The region between the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates is highly varied in 
geography and climate. Coastal plains merge in a few kilometres with mountain 
ranges, which then plummet to rift valleys with the lowest land elevations on 
Earth. Rainfall ranges from more than 1 000 mm/year to essentially nil. The 
average is about 250 mm, which is the limit for unirrigated agriculture, but in this 
region, averages can be highly misleading. It is much more important to 
understand the spatial, seasona1, and annual variations in rainfall than national or 
annual aitiagts. 
Bakour and Kolars (1994) showed that the Mashrek lies in a transition 
zone. To the north, the land receives more rainfall; to the south, even less. The 
dominant hydrological characteristic is the combination of aridity and uncertainty. 
Figure 2, taken from their study, compares the two curves: one showing 
diminishing average rainfall, and the other showing increasing variance (both from 
north to south across the region). In their words, "the zone of greatest 
unpredictability is at the intersection of the precipitation and variance curves," that 
is, in the populated, semi-arid regions of the Middle East. Whereas regions of 
higher rainfall sometimes suffer droughts and regions of lower rainfall sometimes 
experience floods, this region bas to cope with both. 
Even where the variations of rainfall are predictable, sharp transitions 
bedevil any attempt to use averages. Rainfall along the coast, at the higher 
elevations of many countries, and in the northern part of the region is more than 
500 mm/year, which suggests that irrigation is unnecessary. However, all the rain 
falis in four winter months, so storage systems are necessary to hold back the flow 
and permit release during the summer, when demand for water is at its peak. 
(Unfortunately, large storage systems are generally built as surface reservoirs, 
which increase evaporation and, thus, decrease still further the volume of water 
available.) 
Variations also occur across short distances. The north end of the Gaza 
Strip gets rain at upwards of 400 mm/year; barely 50 km to the south, at the 
border with Egypt, the Gaza Strip gets less than 250 mm/year. The thin coastal 
strip of Lebanon gets nearly 2.5 x 109 m3/year; just 50 km to the east, across the 
Lebanon mountains, the Beka'a Valley, where most of the irrigated agriculture is 
located, gets only 0.9 x 109 m3. 
The most important variations in rainfall are neither seasonal nor 
geographic but annual. In eastern North America, reliable flow (defined as what 
can be expected 9 years out of 10) will be 60-80% of the long-term average; in 
western North America, reliable flow falis to 30% of the average. In the Middle 
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Fig. 2. General characteristics of development in the Arab Mashrek. Source: Bakour and Kolars 
(1994). 
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East, reliable flow is less than 10%. These year-to-year variations in rainfall in the 
Middle East have enormous implications for water systems. In contrast to Europe, 
Canada, and much of the United States, extreme years in the Middle East must be 
treated as normal, not abnormal, and water planning and management must focus 
on risk minimization, not maximum use. 
Demography and economy 
Most countries in the region are experiencing rapid population growth, with rates 
of 2.5% per year. Although population densities are not particularly high by world 
standards, density per hectare of agricultural land is another story. Bahrain has a 
remarkable 7 000 people per arable hectare; Egypt and Kuwait have close to 2 000; 
and the other Gulf States, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, have more chan 500 
(Rogers 1994). In the United States, the ratio is less than 2. Other sources of stress 
corne from rapid urbanization (which increases the demand for high-quality water, 
without diminishing the demand for irrigation water), and the booming economic 
growth. 
Demographic and economic sources of stress are common to many regions 
of the. world. What makes a différence in this region is the dominance of 
agricultural uses of water, mainly irrigation. Even in relatively urbanized Lebanon, 
irrigation Cakes close to 80% of total water. Every country provides water to 
farmers at moderately to heavily subsidized prices. Although not all water 
withdrawn for irrigation is actually consumed, the proportion that is returned to 
a watercourse and the extent of degradation in the natural recycling remain 
controversial (Moore and Seckle 1993). In Egypt, a great deal is returned with 
relatively little degradation, but it is dangerous to generalize from the Nile (Allen 
1994). 
In contrast to agriculture's dominance of regional-water accounts is its 
decline in economic accounts. Agriculture represents less than 5% of gross 
national product (GNP) in Israel and Turkey and less than 10% in Jordan and 
Lebanon. Agriculture represents about 20% of GNP in Egypt and Iraq, and a little 
more.in Syria and the West Bank. Only in Ethiopia, the Gaza Strip, and Sudan 
does the share approach 40% of GNP. In most countries, the share of employment 
in agriculture is higher than agriculture's share of GNP, but in Israel and Lebanon, 
with their capital-intensive farming, the share of employment is lower. With such 
disproportionate use of water in one sector, and a declining sector at that, political 
sources of stress are bound to occur. 
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Quantity: the economic crisis 
With its limited water resources, the region from the Nile to the Euphrates not 
surprisingly contains some of the most parsimonious users of water in the world. 
A Bedouin may get along with as little as 4 or 5 L/person per day for al] uses. 
Only Australian Aborigines seem to use less. What is a surprise is that the came 
region also contains some of the least parsimonious users of water. The Gulf 
States rate among the highest per capita users of water in the world. 
Almost all the states of the Arabian Peninsula are consuming much more 
water than their annual renewable water supply, as are Israel, Jordan, and Libya. 
Egypt, Syria, and Sudan are fast approaching this situation. Indeed, some 
projections suggest that by 2025 domestic uses (about 100 L/person per day), plus 
municipal and industrial uses, will require ail the freshwater available, leaving 
none for agriculture, in the countries of the Lower Jordan (Shuval 1992; Assaf et 
al. 1993). Even if no more water is devoted to agriculture over the next few years, 
these countries are in trouble: their water use is unsustainable, which implies that 
their whole economy is unsustainable. Apart from desalination or imports, the only 
ways to significantly improve the situation are to improve water efficiency in 
existing uses and to shift water from low-productivity to high-productivity water 
sectors. The dominance of irrigation means that both efficiency improvements and 
sectoral shifts must emphasize agriculture. 
Principal sources of water 
Throughout history, this region has depended on three main sources of water: 
rivers, aquifers, and imports (through trade in food). Allen (1994) estimated that 
the quantity of water imported indirectly into the Middle East as food amounted 
to 50 x 109 m', equivalent to one third of the water directly used and about equal 
to the annual flow of the Nile in Egypt. Of course, the Middle East also exports 
food, so the net indirect trade in water is smaller. 
Rivers are the best-known sources of water, and the rivers in this region 
include two of the greatest in the world, the Nile and the Euphrates. As well, 
many short streams or ephemeral wadis occur, typically being fed by springs in 
the mountains and spilling into the sea. Aquifers of various types are also 
common. Some are replenished regularly by rainfall and constitute renewable 
resources; others contain water buried in sediments Bons ago and, thus, constitute 
nonrenewable resources; a few others occur along fracture zones. Over time, as 
surface sources have become fully committed and as technology has permitted 
deeper drilling, there has been a shift to groundwater. Even sô, only about 10% 
of the total supply for the region cornes from groundwater. However, in Israel and 
Jordan, the share from groundwater approaches 50%; and in the Arabian 
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Peninsula, 100% (if desalination is put to one side). Apart from a few cities, no 
other region is so dependent on aquifers. 
Few opportunities remain for further development of major rivers in these 
countries; on the contrary, if development occurs, it will more likely be in the 
upstream countries, such as Ethiopia and Turkey, which could reduce flows 
downstream (Allen 1994; Hillel 1994). Major freshwater aquifers remain to be 
developed (indeed, to be discovered), but they are either very deep or located far 
from points of consumption. 
Recycling water 
Recycled water may well be the fourth conventional source. Today, the use of 
treated, recycled sewage water is accepted practice in countries, such as Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, and Morocco. (In some countries, raw sewage continues to be used, 
which risks the spread of choiera and other diseases.) Countries in the region that 
are truly short of water will have shifted largely from fresh to recycled water for 
irrigating crops early next century. Some recycled water receives only primary 
treatment, in which case, use should be restricted to nonfood crops, and special 
care should be taken to protect farm workers. A good part of the water receives 
secondary treatment, which means that it can be used for crops that are eaten after 
cooking. Only water that bas received tertiary treatment can be used for al] crops. 
The European Economic Community is considering a proposai to embargo crops 
grown in reclaimed sewage, but this ride should be resisted as a nontariff barrier 
designed to protect European farmers. If implemented, it would be a severe blow 
to Middle Eastern agriculture. Tests for heavy metals and other contaminants not 
eliminated by conventional treatment are reasonable, but not a flat embargo. 
Alternative sources of water 
There are many other small, but potentially much larger, sources of water. They 
can be divided into two groups, depending on a pair of criteria that tend to move 
in parallel: capital requirements and degree of centralization. Of particular interest 
in the Middle East are the following: 
Low-capital-decentralized solutions 
rainwater catchment from roofs and other structures 
rainwater harvesting in fields and in limans 
capture of flood and winter runoff 
desert dams 
aquifer recharge 
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High-capital-centralized solutions 
desalination of seawater 
desalination of brackish water 
imports of water by tanker, pipeline, or medusa bags 
cloud seeding 
Much more attention should be paid to the low-capital-decentralized 
options than to the high-capital-centralized ones. To a large extent, the former are 
not only technically proven but typically more cost effective, given the marginal 
costs of new conventional water supply. Some options, such as rooftop rainwater 
catchment, produce only small total quantities of water, but it is potable water. 
Even in areas of low rainfall, such as the Gaza Strip, it is possible to design low- 
cost systems, with cisterris scaled to families, that will provide for ail drinking and 
cooking needs (5-7 L/person per day) in most years. The greater problem is not 
designing the systems but convincing people unused to this technique that the 
stored water is, indeed, potable. 
With the exception of cloud seeding, which has been practiced in some 
countries for years, the remaining systems are generally too expensive for 
widespread use. A partial exception must be made for brackish-water desalination, 
which, depending on location and sait content, can be an appropriate option. 
Imports of water must be considered, if only because in some countries the use 
of water depends on the importation of energy. For example, about 20% of 
Jordan's electricity and 12% of Israel's is used for water pumping. Although such 
a high share may not be typical (both nations must move large volumes of water 
from lower to higher elevations), these countries are willing to import oil, in one 
case, and coal, in the other, so that they can pump water. Of the import options 
available, the Canadian technology of medusa bags (large plastic bags towed 
behind ocean-going tugs) appears attractive but remains to be proven at full scale. 
Turkey is the one country in the region that appears to be both willing and able 
to consider water imports. 
Desalinated seawater is, of course, the ultimate, unlimited source, and 
about two thirds of the world's "desal" capacity is located in this region. 
However, ail technologies use such vast quantities of energy that major use is 
restricted to those countries with low-cost oil reserves or heavy-oil fractions left 
after refining. More potential exists for desalination of brackish water containing 
up to about 5 000 ppm of salis. Relatively small quantities of brackish water have 
been desalinated in many countries. In its peace treaty with Jordan, Israel 
committed itself to desalinating the saline springs that it has diverted to the Lower 
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Jordan, which now makes this water too salty for use by Palestinian and Jordanian 
farmers. 
A few sources do not fit neatly into either of the two groups. For example, 
there are numerous aquifers that contain 1000-5 000 ppm of salts - too salty 
to be potable but acceptable for certain uses. Some of these aquifers are huge, 
including one that underlies almost the entire Sinai and Negev deserts. Issar 
(1994) suggested that the area could be developed on the basis of industrial and 
agricultural uses of saline water. The aquifers contain fossilized water and, 
therefore, are nonrenewable, but the supplies are so vast that centuries of use is 
possible at any likely pumping rate. 
The submarine springs that occur all along the coast of Lebanon, Israel, 
and Gaza and maybe farther are another source of unknown potential. The 
locations are well known to fisherfolk because some fish can be found at the point 
where the freshwater and seawater mingle,* but no one has ever proposed a 
practical and ecologically safe method for capturing and bringing the water to the 
shore. 
Main uses of water 
Except in a few cases where the objective is to preserve natural beauty, water is 
not desired for its own sake but because it can satisfy human needs. Despite this 
basic fact, nowhere is the information available on water use as detailed or 
comprehensive as that on water supply. Worse yet, with some exceptions, the 
information is based on deliveries of water, not actual use, which means that it is 
impossible to make accurate measures of efficiency. 
Water use can be broadly divided into four categories: household, 
municipal, industry, and agriculture. (Municipal use refers both to the water 
delivered to commercial buildings and hotels, mainly for the came purposes as 
households, and to the generally larger amounts used for municipal gardens, street 
cleaning, fire fighting, etc.) Household use accounts for 3-20% of the 
consumption; municipal, 3-10%; industry, 1-10%; and agriculture, 50-90%. 
A surprisingly small proportion is required to meet the drinking-water 
standards defined by the World Health Organization. At 5-7 L/person per day, 
only about 2 X 106 m3/year is needed for every 1 million inhabitants, which is not 
very much. In most parts of the world and, certainly, in this region, major uses do 
not require water of potable quality. Depending on the potential contact with 
humans or the possible fouling of equipment, water of moderately to significantly 
lower quality can be used. In the future, cities may move to dual systems, with a 
small pipe providing potable water for drinking and cooking and a larger one 
providing lower quality water for other uses. Unfortunately, in many countries of 
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the region, there is only a single system, and the water delivered meets only the 
lower standard. 
Pricing reform is at the top of the agenda of every economist who has 
looked at water supply and demend in the region. Studies of water use in the 
region have found that consumers of water are subsidized and that these subsidies 
increase water use above what it %vould be if consumers had to pay the full costs. 
Despite the différences. in supply, most consumers in this arid region pay no more 
for water than consumers in humid parts of the United States (Rogers 1994). The 
need for water-pricing reform is reinforced by other factors. First, because the 
volumes of water needed to sustain life are so small, it does not matter much 
whether drinking water is subsidized in the interests of equity or public health. 
Drinking water is not the probleml Second, among all consumers, farmers receive 
the greatest subsidies, particularly in comparison with value of output. For some 
crops, the value added by irrigation is less than the average cost of supplying the 
water. Third, water prices are typically compared with average cost, but, for 
economic efficiency, consumers should be paying the marginal cost (the cost to 
get additional water), which is higher yet. Although most other countries also 
subsidize water consumers, especially farmers, few countries are so short of water 
as those between the Nile and the Euphrates. Gradual movement toward more 
economically efficient water-pricing should be possible without major social losses 
but with definite ecological gains. 
Conservation of water 
Conservation of water, including both increases in efficiency of existing uses and 
changing use patterns, has always been a major consideration in the water-short 
Middle East. (Ejciency and conservation are commonly used as synonyms, but, 
more precisely, the former refers to minimizing inputs to achieve a given output, 
whereas the latter includes changes in the output. Less formally, efficiency deals 
with how one accomplishes a task, whereas conservation also includes changes in 
the task.) However, as we learned from deeper analysis of energy use, the fact that 
a region is short of energy (water) does not imply either that existing uses are effi- 
ciently satisfied or that the pattern of use is appropriate. Many factors, including 
capital barriers, ill-designed policies, inaccessible technology, lack of information, 
and habits and traditions intervene. 
Continuing with the analogy with energy (Stiles, this volume), we can say 
that private firms and public bodies must begin to look at reductions in the use of 
water as a source of supply - a very large source, equivalent to but, in many 
ways, better than new primary sources. In separate analyses of water-rich Canada 
and water-short Israel, quite comparable proportionate cost-effective savings were 
MIDDLE EAST 83 
identified (Brooks and Peters 1988; Kahana 1991). This does not mean that 
Canada and Israel are at equivalent levels of water efficiency. Canada uses four 
and a half times as much water per capita as Israel. However, because water 
prices are so much lower in Canada than in Israel, the potential gains in economic 
efficiency are similar. Without changing use patterns but relying only on off-the- 
shelf technologies, savings typically exceed 25% and, in some cases, reach 50%. 
In just 2 years, the city of Jerusalem cut its municipal water use by 14%. These 
results suggest that the largest potential source of water for most countries in the 
region will be found through savings achieved by conservation. 
Although none of the countries under study cornes close to maximizing 
economic, much less technical, potentials of efficiency in using water, the 
dominance of irrigation requires special attention. Israel is generally regarded as 
a model of efficiency in irrigation. Israel pioneered the development of drip 
irrigation and has gone on to improve the technique with sensors and computer 
controls that respond to plant requirements, rather than using a predetermined 
watering schedule. Today, water use per irrigated hectare is 40% less than it was 
in 1955, and gains continue to be made, although at a declining rate (Kahana 
1991; Hillel 1994). Drip irrigation also reduces the likelihood of both salinization 
and pollution from runoff. Other nations in the region, notably Jordan, have 
adapted drip irrigation for many crops and are now producing their own pipes and 
other equipment. Unfortunately, drip irrigation is a capital-intensive technology, 
and it is not appropriate for all crops. 
The greater question about Israeli agriculture and, by extension, all 
agriculture in the region is not, however, whether water is used efficiently in 
irrigation but whether irrigation is an efficient use of water. Almost every analysis 
shows that Israel's economy would be stronger and the total value of output would 
be increased if water was transferred from agriculture to industrial or municipal 
uses (Lonergan and Brooks 1994). The opposite appears to be true in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip; those economies would be stronger if water could be 
transferred into agriculture. Careful analysis would be needed to say whether other 
countries in the region lie Gloser to the Israeli or to the Palestinian case. 
In conclusion, the social gains from approaching water problems from the 
demand side are very high and not restricted to direct financial savings. Reducing 
demand is also a very effective strategy (perhaps the most effective strategy) to 
minimize risk and to reduce environmental damage. The demand approach 
suggests that in most countries of the region, sonie water could be transferred 
from agriculture to other sectors, with overall gains for the standard of living and, 
very possibly, for the quality of life. The implication is that the long-term demand 
for water is much more elastic to price and policy than is recognized. In contrast, 
some analysts believe that water-short areas, such as the Jordan Valley countries, 
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will have no alternative but to turn to external sources by early in the next century 
(Assaf et al. 1993). These analysts argue that even a higher level of end-use 
efficiency and a total shift of freshwater out of agriculture would be insufficient. 
Water quality: the ecological crisis 
Water quality, the second composent of the regional water crisis, is less ancient 
but equally pressing. In the spring of 1994, five nations (Bahrain, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates) participated in an environmental 
conférence organized by the American University of Beirut, and each of them 
identified water pollution as a critical issue. The key point is that - again by 
analogy to energy - it is just as important to conserve the quality of water as to 
conserve its quantity (Brooks 1994; Lonergan and Brooks 1994). According to 
Assaf et al. (1993), Israel is losing 3-10 x 106 m3/year of drinking water because 
of declining water quality. 
Most water-quality problems derive from one or more of four factors: 
overpumping of aquifers, runoff from agriculture, discharge of human and 
industrial wastewater, and loss of habitat. 
Overpumping of aquifers 
Overpumping of wells causes a decline in the water table. During the recent 
drought, when aquifers were pumped particularly hard, water levels in Israel were 
falling typically by 10-40 cm/year. Unfortunately, overpumping, or "mining," of 
what should be renewable aquifers is all too common in this region. 
A decline in the water table has several adverse effects. At a minimum, it 
adds to pumping colts and increases energy use. More important, a lower water 
table permits lower quality water to flow inward and contaminate the freshwater 
of the aquifer. Many of the countries in the region have coastal aquifers that, in 
their natural state, are 3-5 m above sea level; this, in turn, creates an outward 
pressure that blocks the inflow of seawater. Pumping, or, more accurately, 
overpumping, has lowered the freshwater level to below sea level, so the effect 
is reversed and sait water from the Mediterranean can now be found 1-3 km 
inland. 
Runoff from agriculture 
Irrigation is obviously good for farmers (MacLean and Voss, this volume). 
However, irrigation systems also pose environmental problems. In most countries 
in the region, agricultural runoff is the major non-point source of pollutants, 
including sediment, phosphorous, nitrogen, and pesticides. Per-hectare use of 
pesticides and fertilizers in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine rates among the highest 
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in the world, and runoff is correspondingly high. One result of this is that over the 
past two decades, nitrate (from both fertilizers and reused sewage effluent) 
concentrations in the coastal aquifer underlying Israel and the Gaza Strip have 
doubled (Gabbay 1992). In Syria, Al-Sin Lake, the main freshwater source, is 
polluted by runoff. Such problems are anything but inevitable. Practices like 
conservation tillage, contour planting, terracing, and the use of filter systems can 
control soit erosion and reduce phosphorous and nitrogen runoff by up to 60% 
(World Resources Institute 1992). 
Problems are magnified at the greenhouses and poultry factories, which are 
increasingly widespread in the region. Greenhouses are periodically rinsed, with 
as much as half of the chemicals going directly into the soil. Good practice 
isolates these operations from contact with groundwater and recycles the rince 
water, but good practice is uncommon. In addition, the otherwise attractive use of 
brackish water for irrigation can increase soif salinity. Washing out the salts with 
freshwater can alleviate local problems, but this would allow the salts to drain into 
watercourses or aquifers, with potential long-term problems. For this reason, 
irrigation with brackish water is subject to special regulations where it is donejust 
above sensitive parts of the coastal aquifer in Israel. 
Discharge of human and industrial wastewater 
Cities in this region are old - in some cases, ancient - and, just as with many 
newer cities, water-supply and sewer systems have either begun to deteriorate or 
cannot handle the growing loads placed on them. For example, the City of 
Jerusalem still discharges half its wastewater untreated into dry riverbeds. (A 
treatment plant is now being built.) In some cases, systems have been damaged 
by war. Water losses in Beirut went up from 40% to well over 60% during the 
15 years of civil strife, and many sewage-treatment plans are inoperable because 
of shelling. Generally, however, urban areas in the region have adequate systems. 
In contrast, the situation is far from adequate in smaller cities and rural areas. In 
a few cases, as in much of the Gaza Strip, the need for investment in water- 
supply, drainage, and sanitation facilities is immediate. 
It is difficult to assess the extent of industrial contamination in the region 
because so few tests are done, and when tests are done, the results are seldom 
disclosed. Spot checks by the Ministry of the Environment in Israel have found 
concentrations of specific contaminants at levels that are a few to 100 times the 
levels allowable in European countries. Conditions elsewhere are unlikely to be 
any better. Throughout the region, dumping of industrial wastes is common, 
sometimes directly into watercourses and sometimes into wadis, which, at the next 
rainfall, allows contaminants to seep into aquifers. Cleaning a polluted river is 
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difficult; cleaning a polluted aquifer is much more so, and in some cases is simply 
not possible (Goldenberg and Melloul 1992). Even agricultural processing has its 
problems. Olive-oil mills, an otherwise excellent innovation that increases the 
value added from farming and provides employment in rural areas, produce both 
solid and liquid residues. The solid residues can be put back on fields, but the 
liquid residues have so high a biochemical oxygen demand that they are generally 
just dumped. The impact of about 40 mills in Jordan is equal to that of a city of 
1 million people. 
Loss of habitat 
Finally, water quality in the region is being seriously degraded by losses of natural 
habitat, mainly wetlands. As a result of decisions to drain swamps, canalize rivers, 
or expand the agricultural frontier, water that was providing habitat for a multitude 
of plant and animal species is lost. Dredging and reclamation of land to expand 
urban space in Bahrain has not only destroyed commercial fishing grounds but 
also blocked natural drainage of agricultural land and increased the salinity of 
groundwater. 
Why are these losses important? It is because water in place and the 
habitats it supports have value. Some of the values of in situ water, such as those 
associated with fisheries and hydropower or even with the prevention of 
subsidence above an aquifer, can be measured in conventional economic tenus. 
Other values are partially calculable, such as those associated with recreation and 
tourism or with the dilution or purification of wastes. Some values are extremely 
difficult to capture in economic terras, like those associated with the regulation of 
river flows or the support of plant and animal habitat. 
Losses in the region resulting from uncontrolled use of wetlands are 
unknown but clearly high. For example, the King Talai reservoir is too polluted 
for recreational use, but, as the only standing body of water in Jordan, this 
pollution cames an extraordinary opportunity cost. Wetland conversion can also 
be controversial. Construction of the Jonglei scheme to increase water flows to 
Egypt and Sudan "was stopped in the early 1980s as a result of violent opposition 
by the local communities who did not want their livelihoods and ways of life 
changed by the draining of the swamps of the Sudd" (Allen 1994). In the case of 
the Hula Swamp, the draining of which was Israel's first megaproject, plans are 
under way to restore part of the drained area to its original ecology. 
Water equity: the political crisis 
Water, not oil, has historically been at the heart of most political conflicts in the 
countries in this region. This section considers the internai institutions that have 
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been developed to manage conflicts among sectors; and the international insti- 
tutions that have been developed to manage conflicts among nations. 
Internai institutions 
This region is characterized by some of the largest and most sophisticated water- 
management agencies in the world. By and large, they have achieved the goals set 
out for them. They manage the water systems within their jurisdiction with great 
care, and they have developed impressive databases that permit control on a well- 
by-well or pump-by-pump basis. The real problems lie deeper - one begins to 
question the goals themselves and the structures erected to achieve these goals. 
In every country of the region, water-management institutions are oriented 
to the goals of supply management (construction of dams, storage reservoirs, and 
other engineering works), with little attention to demand management. Further, the 
national institutions typically devote most of their attention to large-scale, 
centralized forms of supply management. Small-scale, decentralized options tend 
to be neglected or left to communities. The national institutions tend to be 
insensitive to indigenous practices, gender concerns, ethnic groups, and the 
environmental impacts of the institutions' actions. Such organizations merely 
reflect the concerns of the governments that created them. 
Water-management agencies in this region differ only in degree from their 
counterparts in mort other countries, North or South. Their true distinctiveness lies 
in two other characteristics: the centralization of water management at the national 
level and their close relationship with national agricultural agencies. Every one of 
the Middle Eastern countries has a ministry or senior agency in control of water 
affairs. Lebanon, for example, has the Ministry of Water and Electricity. Jordan 
has the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. In Israel, the Water Commissioner, a 
powerful official who controls planning, construction, and management of the 
nation's water system, reports to the even more powerful Minister of Agriculture. 
The situation is mixed in Syria and Egypt, where central agencies maintain control 
over irrigation water, and dornestic water supply is left to local or municipal 
agencies. 
The close political association of water and agriculture means that 
intersectoral conflicts tend either to be ignored or to be resolved in favour of 
farmers. It also means that interna] water institutions resist suggestions to increase 
water prices for farmers or to move toward any form of water market or other 
means of establishing rational allocation. (There are many policy choices between 
volume allocation and pure markets that can provide for efficiency and equity.) 
As a resust of the use of nonmarket prices in the face of limited water supplies, 
central control is required to impose allocations by volume or time of use; in rural 
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areas, like those along the upper Nile, traditional patterns of allocation may still 
hold. Outside agriculture, prices are less closely controlled, and there is less need 
for allocation. In many countries (notably, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and Yemen), 
demand is supply limited because of the infrastructure being unreliable or 
undersized or because of the poor quality of the water, particularly in the summer. 
An exception to the bias in favour of agriculture occurs in times of 
drought. When water-supply allocations must be cut back, farmers typically bear 
the brunt of cutbacks. No sector can reduce water use so extensively and so 
quickly as agriculture. 
International institutions 
Surface water commonly crosses or forms an international border; aquifers 
commonly underlie a border. For a somewhat larger part of the Middle East, 
Rogers (1994) counted 25 international rivers. I know of no comparable tabulation 
for aquifers, but two examples are the Disi Aquifer, which underlies the border 
of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and the Mountain (Yarkon-Taninim) Aquifer, which 
underlies Israel and Palestine. The Litani, in Lebanon, is one of the few rivers 
carrying more than 500 x 106 m3/year that does not cross an international border. 
International water is almost everywhere a subject of intense debate, with 
the discussion dominated by international lawyers and diplomats, rather than by 
social or physical scientists. In the Middle East, the basic principle for sharing 
water remains that of equitable use. This implies that the ways specific bodies of 
water are shared must be negotiated to fit the physical, economic, and social 
context of the parties involved. The rights of parties to specific quantities and 
qualities of water remain a contentious issue. In these circumstances, it might be 
helpful to shift attention from rights aimed at the supply side to rights to guarantee 
certain levels of demand. This is the effect of an approach supported by an 
Israeli-Palestinian team (Assaf et al. 1993), who proposed entitlements of 125 m3 
of potable water per person per year (Shuval 1992). 
Although international law applies most directly to surface water, each of 
the principles used in dealing with surface water applies to underground water, 
qualified of course by the limited knowledge of aquifer hydraulics and the greater 
difficulty of monitoring. A model treaty for internationally shared aquifers has 
been drafted (Hayton and Utton 1989), but it has not yet been extensively 
discussed by politicians. 
Discussions about international waters, including those in the Middle East, 
typically conclude with a call for basin-wide or aquifer-wide commissions to 
manage them as a unit. In my view, such schemes are visionary or, at best, 
premature. There is simply too little trust among these nations to consider joint 
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management. It has taken the United States and Canada many years to establish 
joint procedures for management of the St. Lawrence River and almost as long for 
the Netherlands and Belgium to learn how to manage the aquifer that underlies 
their border. 
This go-slow approach toward international management is not intended 
to preclude cooperation by way of prior notification of changes in river regime or 
specific joint institutions, such as those for research. Nor does it exclude the 
possibility of true joint management in those cases, such as the Mountain Aquifer, 
where Israelis and Palestinians really have no other alternative (Feitelson and 
Haddad 1994). Even in these cases, step-by-step movement toward cooperation 
with parallel but not united institutions on either ride of the border would 
probably be more successful than attempts to move quickly to regional institutions. 
Although joint management seems premature for quantity issues, it may not 
be so for quality issues. Competing demands for water rights have something of 
a zero-sum aspect about them, whereas environmental problems can affect all 
parties together. Nations that share water resources, particularly aquifers, should 
therefore experiment, at first, with joint water-quality management. 
Militarization of water 
Over the years, many people have argued that a war over water in the Middle East 
is more or less likely (most recently, Bulloch and Darwish 1993). It is true that, 
at times, shots have been fired and bombs dropped on water installations. 
Skirmishes were occurring between Israel and its neighbours just prior to the 1967 
war, and Israel bombed a partially completed dam on the Yarmouk, late in that 
war. Iraq destroyed much of Kuwait's water-desalination capacity during the Gulf 
War. However, to go from these examples to a general proposition of water wars 
ignores the wide range of options available for overcoming water scarcity, such 
as drip irrigation and shifts to crops that consume less water. Such approaches can 
relieve the pressure much less expensively and with much less risk than military 
conflict. 
Consider what is presumably the point of greatest dispute: the Jordan 
Valley. Even here, where the allocation of water is anything but equitable, water 
problems stem as much from intemal economic decisions as from the special 
conditions of military occupation (Elmussa 1993). Using a différent approach, 
researchers in the Harvard Middle East Water Project have reached the same 
conclusion. Depending on the particular resolution of the property rights to water, 
the total value of water in dispute between Israelis and Palestinians cannot exceed 
$600 million CAD per year (in 1996, 1.36 Canadian dollars [CAD] = 1 United 
States dollar [USD]) and probably lies Gloser to $200 million CAD. This is not 
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very much money in international terms. The annual cost of water loss appears to 
be well under the daily cost of modern warfare. 
If water wars in the Jordan Valley are unlikely, one wonders whether they 
will occur anywhere. There are simply better alternatives than war. However, these 
may not be politically easy or free of conflict. "Water shortages will aggravate 
tensions and unrest within societies," but, as opposed to outright warfare, "internat 
civil disorder, changes in regimes, political radicalization and instability" are the 
more likely consequences (Homer-Dixon et al. 1993). 
Research as part of the solution 
Research priorities should cover three categories: technical, socio- and enviro- 
economic, and institutional. The following are the most pressing research gaps. 
Technical studies 
1. Agricultural techniques appropriate for water scarcity: 
use of poor-quality or saline water; 
degree of natural recycling under différent conditions; and 
long-term effects of recycling irrigation water and treated wastewater. 
2. Aquifer hydraulics and potentials: 
discontinuous or karstic formations; and 
fossil aquifers. 
3. Alternative sources of supply: 
rooftop harvesting for drinking water; and 
rainwater harvesting and savanization for improved ecological con- 
ditions and farming. 
4. Existing and alternative strategies in agriculture and industry for times of 
water stress. 
Socioeconomic and enviroeconomic studies 
1. Application of "soft energy" approaches to water to determine how far the 
analogy can be pursued and whether comparable policies could be 
proposed. 
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2. Careful estimation of the elasticity of long-term water demand to 
combinations of price, income, and policy change. 
3. Better definition of noncommercial services, such as recreation; of environ- 
mental services, such as habitat preservation; and of water in situ. 
4. Evaluation of market-based options for national or regional water 
management: 
efficiency and equity effects of marginal-cost pricing and other pricing 
structures on various sectors, ecosystems, and classes; 
efficiency and equity effects of alternative quasi-market allocation 
techniques; 
methods for adjusting pricing for différent qualities of water supply and 
of wastewater runoff; and 
approaches based on international trading at nationally determined 
prices (such as the Harvard Middle East water model). 
5. Review of traditional methods of augmenting water supply and limiting 
water demand to see how they compare (in efficiency, equity, and gender 
effects) with modem methods. 
6. Evaluation, using various criteria, of the range of megaproject and regional 
import options for major increments of water supply, to develop a 
preferred ranking under various conditions. 
Institutional studies 
1. Better identification of the barriers to the adoption of, or investment in, 
water-saving technologies; and design of policies to lower chose barriers. 
2. 
3. 
Comparison of market and nonmarket institutions for distributing water 
efficiently and equitably. 
Options for Joint or shared management of transboundary water resources, 
particularly with respect to water quality. 
4. Options for community- or common-property management for water. 
5. Measures to increase awareness of the need and thé means to conserve 
6. 
water. 
Improved design for water utilities that incorporate 
water supply and wastewater removal and reuse; 
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supply-side and demand-side concerns; and 
economic, ecological, and social issues. 
Conclusion 
What the Middle East faces is not so much a water crisis as a chronic problem 
escalating to crisis dimensions because older problems are deepening at the saure 
time as newer ones are becoming evident. With few exceptions, the countries in 
this region have already reached or are fast approaching the limits of their 
indigenous water supplies. In the absence of imports, greater efficiency in water 
use or shifts of water from one sector to another are the only options left, except 
for those few countries with enough energy to run desalination plants. Greater 
efficiency in water use may be encouraged by the existing institutions; shifts of 
water from one sector to another are almost never encouraged by the existing 
institutions. 
Water is the consummate political issue in the Middle East. The role of 
research should be to ensure that economically efficient, ecologically sustainable, 
and politically acceptable alternatives are developed and put forward forcefully 
enough to lead to both the necessary internai adjustments and the equally 
necessary international negotiations. In the absence of political movement, water 
could, indeed, be a destabilizing or disruptive element in national and international 
relations. 
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